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Introduction
There are a number of state level institutions designed 
to limit the impact of special interests on government 
or to facilitate citizen participation in government. 
These include legislative term limits, ballot initiatives, 
governors’ line item veto power and public funding for 
legislative and gubernatorial candidates.  While most of 
these state government institutions are fairly common 
around the United States (see Table 1), relatively little is 
known about Americans’ opinion of them.  This policy 
note explores Americans’ views on these features as 
well as the relationship between survey respondents’ 
partisanship and their approval of these state government 
institutions. 
To assess the public’s attitudes on these political institutions, 
researchers at the Harry S Truman School of Public Affairs 
at the University of Missouri conducted a national survey 
of 1,000 adults.  The survey was administered as part 
of the 2007 Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(CCES), a 10,000 person survey conducted through 
the collaborative efforts of a consortium of universities.1 
The 2007 CCES was administered in November 2007 by 
Polimetrix, an Internet survey ﬁrm located in Palo Alto, 
California.
Approval of State Government Institutions
Term limits, ballot measures, and line item veto power 
are relatively popular among survey respondents (see 
Table 1).  Sizable majorities of the public approve of 
these institutions, with 40% strongly approving of term 
limits, 31% strongly approving of ballot measures, and 
about 24% strongly approving of line item veto power 
for the governor.  Respondents are nearly evenly split in 
their approval of public funding for state legislative or 
gubernatorial candidates (approximately 35% either for 
or against, with 30% neither approving nor disapproving). 
Overall, it appears that there is broad support for measures 
that are believed to limit legislative power, although there 
is certainly some variation based on partisanship, as is 
discussed below. 
Strongly 
Approve
Approve Neither Disapprove
Strongly 
Disapprove
# States with 
the Institution*
Approval of state legislative 
term limits (n = 998)
40.1% 32.5% 16.7% 7.8% 2.9% 15
Approval of ballot measures 
(n = 988)
30.5% 38.6% 25.2% 4.6% 1.2% 24
Approval of line item veto 
power for governor 
(n = 997)
24.3% 32.6% 26.9% 11.9% 4.3% 44
Approval of public funding 
for gubernatorial candidates 
(n = 998)
15.1% 19.8% 28.6% 20.3% 16.1% 16
Approval of public 
funding for state legislative 
candidates 
(n = 996)
14.6% 19.7% 29.6% 20.4% 15.8% 8
Table 1: Summary of public approval for state institutions
*Source: National Conference of State Legislatures. 
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2Approval of Term Limits for State Legislators
Proponents of term limits argued that they would eliminate 
career politicians and the inﬂuence of special interests 
from the legislature.2   Term limit advocates also claimed 
that term limits would increase the legislature’s diversity 
with more women and minorities serving.
Twenty-one states have passed term limits since 1992, 
although 6 states have repealed term limits since 1997. 
Across 15 states during the 1990s, term limits passed with 
an average of two-thirds of the vote, and several surveys 
have found that recent support for term limits is around 
70%.3  
Several states saw high rates of turnover in just one election 
cycle as the term limits began to take effect.  For example, 
Missouri lost 45% of its legislators in 2003 because of term 
limits, while Michigan termed out more than two-thirds 
of its senators that year.4   The high turnover and relative 
inexperience of new members can tip the balance of 
power towards the executive branch or towards lobbyists.5 
When the ﬁrst generation of legislators were termed-out 
in Missouri, the new leadership was less experienced 
and some institutional continuity was lost.6 Additionally, 
some research has found that term limits can actually lead 
to legislatures that are less responsive to citizens, which 
would suggest that term limits are counterproductive from 
the general public’s perspective.7 
While 80% of Republican respondents either strongly 
approve or approve of term limits, just 65% of Democratic 
respondents felt the same way (See Figure 1).  Democratic 
respondents were also twice as likely to disapprove of 
term limits compared to their Republican counterparts 
(15% vs. 7%).  Nevertheless, a large majority (nearly 
73%) of respondents approve of term limits. 
            
Figure 1: Approval of term limits for state legislators 
by party identiﬁcation
          
Approval of Ballot Measures (Initiatives)
A ballot initiative is a measure that reaches the ballot as 
the result of a citizen petition process and not from the 
state legislature.8   Twenty-four states currently allow for 
ballot initiatives.  Most states that have initiatives passed 
laws allowing for them in the early 20th century.  During 
the Progressive era, the ballot measure process was 
seen as a way to combat corruption and give citizens an 
opportunity for direct democracy in the face of powerful 
industries.  Generally, more states in the West have ballot 
measures than elsewhere in the country, although there 
are a few Northeastern states that also allow for them. 
There are several types of ballot measures allowed in 
states.  Most states with ballot initiatives permit both 
direct constitutional and direct statute measures on the 
ballot. A few states only allow indirect constitutional 
or statute measures, meaning that the initiative must be 
sent to the legislature before being placed on the ballot.9 
Requirements for the number of signatures and the length 
of time allowed to collect signatures also vary by state. 
Of all of the state institutions evaluated in this survey, 
partisanship appears to have the least inﬂuence on 
approval of ballot measures as all three groups show strong 
support for them (see Figure 2). Approximately three out 
of four Independents approve or strongly approve of 
ballot initiatives, while only two out of three Democratic 
respondents do. Democratic respondents were the most 
likely to disapprove, but only 9% disapproved or strongly 
disapproved, compared to 4% of both Independents and 
Republicans.
Figure 2: Approval of ballot measures by party 
identiﬁcation
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3Approval of Gubernatorial Line Item Vetoes
Governors in 44 states have the ability to strike lines from 
appropriations bills without vetoing the entire bill.  The 
intention of this gubernatorial power is to prevent the 
legislature from appropriating funds to special interests 
or pork barrel projects.  In effect, the line item veto serves 
to increase gubernatorial power relative to the legislature. 
There are three main types of line item vetoes.  A governor 
can veto funding for a particular line item, veto funding 
for an entire program or agency, or reduce appropriation 
amounts at his or her discretion.10 
In general, nearly 56% of the survey respondents either 
approved or strongly approved of line item veto power, 
but there is a partisan divide among respondents.  As seen 
in Figure 3, the approval rating is driven by Republican 
and Independent respondents (71% and 60% approving 
or strongly approving).  Only 40% of Democratic 
respondents approve of the line item veto, while 28% 
disapprove or strongly disapprove.  
The stronger Republican and Independent approval ratings 
may reﬂect ﬁscal conservatism among those respondents, 
or a preference for reducing costly entitlement or 
education programs that constitute a sizeable portion 
of state budgets. Some research has also suggested that 
line item vetoes have been used for partisan gain by 
reducing budget appropriations to certain programs that 
the governor dislikes.11   
Approval of Public Funding for Governors and State 
Legislators
Currently 16 states offer some public funding for 
gubernatorial candidates.12   Eight states have public 
    
Figure 3: Approval of gubernatorial line item veto by 
party identiﬁcation
     
funding for state legislators, either as partial public 
ﬁnancing (Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska and Wisconsin) 
or full public ﬁnancing (also called “Clean Elections,” in 
Arizona, Connecticut, Maine and New Jersey).13   
Some research indicates that because of the low level of 
media coverage, incumbents in the state legislature have 
a signiﬁcant advantage over competitors.   Gierzynski and 
Breaux evaluated spending on state legislative campaigns, 
and found that spending by challengers was more 
effective dollar for dollar than spending by incumbents.14 
This ﬁnding suggests that public funding for legislative 
candidates could reduce the incumbent advantage and 
make elections more competitive. 
Public funding approval levels are nearly identical 
between gubernatorial and state legislative campaigns 
(see Figures 4 & 5).  Democratic respondents are more 
likely to approve of public funding while Republican 
respondents are more likely to disapprove. Independents 
are nearly evenly split in their approval for public funding 
of both types of candidates. 
There are two competing views of public funding that 
may inﬂuence responses here. First, proponents of public 
funding consider it as a way to prevent candidates from 
accepting special interest donations that might buy their 
votes on certain legislation, a view more often championed 
by Democrats. On the other hand, some view public 
funding as wasteful spending that has not proven to be 
effective in improving citizen trust in government,15  and 
this opinion may be more likely to be held by Republican 
respondents.  Further analysis is necessary to determine 
the extent to which these two viewpoints explain the 
partisan variation in approval ratings for public funding.
Figure 4: Approval of public funding for gubernatorial 
candidates by party identiﬁcation
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4Figure 5: Approval of public funding for state 
legislative candidates by party identiﬁcation
    
   
   
Conclusions
Public approval of state government institutions 
corresponds with party identiﬁcation.  The partisan divide 
is clearest in terms of public funding for candidates and 
the gubernatorial line item veto.  Democratic respondents 
are more likely to approve of public funding for both 
gubernatorial and state legislative candidates, while 
Republican respondents are much more likely to approve of 
gubernatorial line item vetoes.  Republicans most strongly 
approve of legislative term limits, and Independents are 
the most likely to approve of ballot initiatives, although 
not by large margins. Further analysis is necessary to 
determine whether informed respondents (i.e. those who 
know if their state has ballot initiatives, term limits for 
legislators or public funding) have different approval 
ratings than respondents who are not knowledgeable 
about these tools in their own states.16  
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